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IN T R O D U C T IO N
In January of 1978, the Federal Highway Administration (F H W A )
initiated a nationwide safety review of federal-aid highway construction
projects completed since 1970. The purpose of the review was two-fold,
to determine:
1. The degree to which safety concepts contained in the 1974
A A S H T O publication “ Highway Design and Operational Prac
tices Related to Safety” were being incorporated in new projects
(this publication is commonly called the “Yellow Book” ).
2. T he progress made in the timely safety upgrading of older
federal-aid highways.
T he reviews consisted of an office check of state safety-related poli
cies, standards, and specifications, and a field performance review of
newly completed projects. The field review was a detailed study of
how the highway and its appurtenances perform in preventing accidents
or in reducing accident severity. These reviews were performed under
both day and night conditions. Actually the reviews were accomplished
by the F H W A field offices. A representative from the regional office
was the leader of each regional review group, the remaining members
of the review team usually consisted of the F H W A Division safety
program engineer from the state being reviewed and a safety program
engineer from another division office in that region and state resource
personnel. Division offices prepared a report on the findings in their
state which were then forwarded along with a regional summary, to
the headquarters office task force. T he headquarters office task force
was appointed by former administrator Cox to develop the review
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guidelines, participate in the actual reviews and prepare the final report.
T he task force consisted o f :
Chairman, R. Clarke Bennett, Office of Highway Safety, F H W A
Then Deputy Administrator Karl S. Bowers, Office of Administra
tor, F H W A
Roger Scott, Office of Engineering, F H W A
Roy Anderson, National Transportation Safety Board
Tom Alcorn, National Transportation Safety Board, Alternate
T he F H W A safety review was a major undertaking, it involving
over 150 F H W A field office engineers and 130 state resource personnel.
Representatives from the headquarters office task force participated in
the safety reviews in 22 states. The effort by the headquarters office
task force alone involved traveling 20,000 miles of highways and re
viewing over 130 projects. This resulted in taking over 1,700 photo
graphs of highway features.
The final report on this review was printed in December of 1978,
and has been distributed. The report covers over 20 topics related to
the safety of the highways and is far too extensive to cover in this
presentation. Therefore, I will concentrate my discussion on the general
findings and recommendations of the report.
General Findings
W ith respect to the original charge of the review, to determine if
the Yellow Book safety concepts have been incorporated in new highway

Figure 1. Many new roads such as this one had good geometries and
gentle slopes.
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Figure 2. This curb in front of the guardrail offset could cause a vehicle
to vault the rail.

projects, we are happy to report that generally the states are doing an
excellent job in following the Yellow Book safety concepts on new
highways. There were some notable exceptions. A few states were still
using curbs in the construction of high speed roadways. The review
teams believe this compromised safety. See Figures 1 and 2.
W ith respect to the second charge, timely safety upgrading, there
was wide variation between states, F H W A Division, and Regions on
safety upgrading policies and progress.
Some states—with numerous real hazards on their older interstate—
are not contemplating any major safety upgrading until completion of
the entire interstate. See Figure 3.

Figure 3. Inadequate guardrail on the approach to a bridge—a common
problem on older interstate system highways in need of safety upgrading.
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Other states have accomplished some minor safety upgrading which
is only partially effective. A few states have already accomplished sub
stantial safety upgrading. See Figure 4.

Figure 4. A 5-in. surfacing was accomplished as part of a safety upgrading
project. But it resulted in a hazardous 5-in. dropoff at the edge of the
pavement.
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There was very little evidence that the highway agencies are even
planning to safety upgrade non-interstate highways. It was clearly
evident to the review teams that the real opportunities to improve safety
on our nation’s highways lie in improving the safety of the non-interstate
highway system. These are the roads with the most hazardous conditions
and the same 55 mph speed limit as the interstates. This is where 90%
of all fatalities occur. This will be a difficult job! See Figure 5.

Figure 5. Inadequate guardrail, a common safety upgrading need on non
interstate roads also.

In addition to the general findings already stated, there were a
number of other areas noted during the review which need to receive
greater attention at both the state and F H W A field office level. As an
example, accident data was not being used to evaluate the performance
of highway features, or for operational reviews of sections of highways.
In fact, at the time of the reviews, lack of readily available accident
data, hampered performance evaluation in many of the 22 states visited
by the headquarters office task force. T w o states could only produce a
general fatality rate for the sections of roadway under review. Five
states provided accident data printouts at the time of the review, but
because information on location or collision type was missing, the data
was impossible to analyze. One state could only produce raw accident
reports, none later than 1976. The remaining states had some type of
data available, but only one state had used the data to analyze the
safety of highway features in advance of the actual review.
Even on new construction, the review teams observed a number of
breakaway sign, guardrail, and crash cushion installations that would
not perform as intended in design. There is an obvious need to estab
lish performance requirements for these devices as well as design specifi
cations. A detailed discussion of this appears in the presentation on
“Design and F H W A Safety Review.”
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Another problem noted by the review teams was a wide variation
between both states and regions related to safety policies, such as ac
commodation of pedestrians—some states provide sidewalks in urban
areas, others do not.
Maintenance of damaged roadside hardware also varied; some were
replaced within 24 hours, others waited months. Policies on accommoda
tion of utilities also varied widely; some states had no policy on utility
placement, and it showed. See Figure 6.
Policies on frequency of repainting markings varied. Some repainted
at short intervals—others waited as long as three years. Some states
mark no passing zones, others do not, and some markings were confusing.
There were various other policies related to signing construction and
maintenance which could compromise safety. See Figures 7 and 8.

Figure 6. Utility poles compromise clear roadside, sign has breakaway
supports.
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Figure 7. Snow pack in front of crash cushion could cause a striking
vehicle to vault.

These variations in safety activity and policies indicate that the
F H W A Division offices need to strengthen their influence over state
highway-related safety activities.
R E C O M M E N D A T IO N S
1. As a result of these findings, the review teams made scores of
recommendations, many of which apply to a specific deficiency

Figure 8. Confusing lane stripe to exit should have been removed when
mainline was extended.
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in a specific F H W A division or region. The recommendations
in the individual state reports have already been brought to the
attention of state agency and some have been implemented. Safety
performance reviews have proved an effective method for identi
fying and quickly initiating needed safety-related improvements.
Therefore, the headquarters office task force recommends that
safety performance reviews should be continued on a formal
basis as a routine procedure by all F H W A offices. These follow
up reviews have been designated as an F H W A emphasis area for
FY 1979.
2. I t is obvious that F H W A must take the initiative in accelerating
safety upgrading on all federal-aid highways. As an overall
recommendation, the task force believes that F H W A should
establish the minimum requirements necessary to constitute a
safety upgrading program, initiate a study of safety upgrading
needs based on these requirements and establish national goals
for accomplishing the upgrading.
3. The next overall recommendation relates to the wide variation
in F H W A influence in state safety policies. I t is recommended
that the division safety program engineer be assigned specific
responsibilities with respect to accident analysis, both at high
accident locations and for the safety performance of highway
hardware. The safety program engineer should also provide
overseeing of safety standards and design criteria, safety upgrad
ing projects, and route and project performance reviews.
4. M any of the safety deficiencies noted during the on-site review
indicate there is a lack of knowledge on the part of construction
and maintenance personnel on the concept of safety performance
of highway hardware. It is recommended that F H W A develop
a series of training courses for both F H W A field and state
personnel. This training should cover, as a minimum, new
safety technology and performance concepts, the timeliness of
repair of damaged hardware, and safety maintenance priorities.
This training is already underway. There is also a need to train
field personnel in the analysis and use of accident records for
monitoring the safety performance of highway features.
5. T he task force also recommends that F H W A undertake research
to determine more realistic criteria for establishing speed limits
which consider such safety-related criteria as roadside conditions,
traffic conflicts, and driver acceptance. Research is also needed
to establish a method to monitor the performance of various
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safety hardware using accident data supplemented by crash
testing.
6. There were also a vast number of safety-related policies that
need to be clarified at the federal and state level with respect to
such things as:
(a) Pedestrian accommodation
(b) Maintenance and replacement of damaged highway hard
ware
(c) Pavement remarking policies
(d) Delineation of roadside hazards
(e) Location of ground mounted sign supports and many, many
others.
T he task force recommends that each office in F H W A headquarters
review the final report and its recommendations, and no later than 90
days after its distribution provide the Federal Highway Administrator
with their recommendations for improvements.
In retrospect, the review identified far more problems than it pro
vided solutions. The final report discusses over 20 highway-related
safety topics and contains over 40 recommendations. Deputy Adminis
trator John Hassell, after reviewing the report, has decided the best
method of implementing the recommendations is through an F H W A
task force of key field and headquarters office personnel. On December
20, 1978, M r. Hassell appointed such a task force and gave the task
force four charges.
1. T o review the findings and recommendations and establish pri
orities for improvements needed in F H W A policies and pro
cedures.
2. Recommend specific corrective action and assign lead responsi
bility to accomplish this to the appropriate headquarters or field
office.
3. Establish safety goals and time frames for implementing improve
ments.
4. Develop a process to monitor the progress of the designated offices
in accomplishing these improvements.
T he first meeting was held January 22, 1979. As a result of this
meeting, the following general instructions have been issued to all
F H W A offices.
1. F H W A headquarters offices will be assigned responsibility for
various report recommendations by the implementation task
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force. The offices should review the report and provide the task
force with follow-up action for appropriate recommendations by
February 28, 1979.
2. Follow-up safety performance reviews by F H W A field offices
should be started in May of 1979.
3. Specific deficiencies in highway safety which are identified through
these reviews are to be corrected in a timely manner.
4. Safety performance reviews made this year should be forwarded
to the office of highway safety by September 1, 1979. T he imple
mentation task force will evaluate these reviews, and together
with results of other activities will provide a report to the admin
istrator by October 1, 1979, on accomplishments this year.
C O N C L U S IO N
T he implementation task force is now in the process of reviewing
the various F H W A office response to the report recommendations and
will meet the week of March 19 to develop the final course of action.
As it now stands, the easy part of our job, the actual safety review,
is completed, but the hard part, determining how and when the problems
noted in the reviews can be corrected and avoided in the future, has
just begun.
It certainly won’t be easy, but it can be done and F H W A is going
to be committing a major portion of its resources to improving the safety
of the nation’s highways. I hope that if another extensive safety review
is conducted, say five years from now, and the Purdue Road School
wants a full report on the findings, the presenter will need no more than
15 minutes, and at least half of his slides can show desirable practices
instead of problems.

